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ANALYSIS OF SAEMAUL UNDONG: A KOREAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT 













Saemaul Undong was a community-based integrated rural development programme 
of the Republic of Korea in the 1970s which contributed to narrowing the developmental 
gap between urban cities and rural communities over a decade. Its success can 
be attributed to its implementation of basic strategies of poverty reduction adapting 
to and making use of the Korean contexts—promoting opportunities and facilitating 
empowerment for rural people. Forty years ago, the people who designed and 
implemented Saemaul Undong did not have a clear understanding of the concepts 
and vocabularies that are broadly used in development today. What they promoted, 
achieved and implemented, however, was not different from the goals, objectives and 
methodologies that development practitioners promote today. The most important 
lesson learned from Saemaul Undong are that it devised appropriate strategies and 
measures reflecting and making use of the specific political, economic and social 
contexts. Developing countries should carefully study their own situation and devise 
workable and practical solutions of their own.
* Manager of the Evaluation Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency. This article was commissioned by 
ESCAP as part of the Regional Poverty Alleviation Programme: Replication of Best Practices in Rural Community 
Development (Saemaul Undong Phase II). The views and any conclusions reached in this article are those of the 
author and do not represent the policies of ESCAP or the Korea International Cooperation Agency.
1  The level of extreme poverty was estimated by 1993 purchasing power parity.
2  Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System, accessed from http://ecos.bok.or.kr.
3  The 1965 poverty figure is from Sang-Mok Seo (1981). “Definition of poverty and time series analysis” pp. 27-28, 
accessed from www.kdi.re.kr/kdi/report/report_read05.jsp?pub_no=00003580 on March 21 2008; the 2007 poverty 
figure is from Myung-Jae Sung (2008). “Analysis on the impact of fiscal policy on Income distribution structure and 
poverty rate”, Monthly Public Finance Forum, Korea Institute of Public Finance, No. 148, October, pp. 8-28.
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	 Though	 its	 economic	 development	 policy	 focused	 on	 industrial	 development,	
the	Republic	of	Korea	effectively	 reduced	rural	as	well	as	urban	poverty.	From	1970,	 the	
Government	 turned	 its	attention	 towards	balanced	growth	between	urban	cities	and	 rural	
communities	and	within	a	decade	managed	to	develop	rural	community	conditions	to	match	
those	of	 the	cities.	At	 the	centre	of	 this	 lies	Saemaul	Undong,4	 the	 integrated	community	
development	programme	of	the	Republic	of	Korea.		
	 This	 paper	 attempts	 to	 re-evaluate	 Saemaul	 Undong,	 focusing	 on	 its	 value	 as	
a	 rural	development	programme,	 identify	what	 it	 really	 is	and	draw	 lessons	applicable	 in	
current	development	practices.	To	do	so,	in	the	next	chapter,	the	initiation,	annual	progress	
and	 results	 of	Saemaul	Undong	will	 be	 explained,	 along	with	 its	 objectives,	 outputs	 and	




II. SAEMAUL UNDONG: PROGRESS AND RESULTS
	 It	is	very	difficult	to	define	Saemaul	Undong	due	to	the	constant	changes	in	its	scope	
and	 agenda.	 If	 one	 focuses	 exclusively	 on	 activities	 performed	 in	 rural	 areas	 from	1970	
to	 1979,	 however,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 some	 common	 denominators	 shared	 throughout	
the	 entire	 movement.	 In	 short,	 Saemaul	 Undong	 was	 a	 community-based	 integrated	











4  In a broad sense, Saemaul Undong, which can be translated as “new village movement” in English, was aimed not 
only at rural development but also, in its latter stages, at various enlightenment activities implemented in industrial 
factories, the military and cities. It is still maintained in some cities and villages under the administration of the privatized 
organization called the National Council of Saemaul Undong Movement in Korea. In general, Saemaul Undong 
is associated with rural development activities in the 1970s and many studies also confine their research scope 
accordingly. In this paper, Saemaul Undong refers only to the rural development activities and projects from 1970 
to 1979 under President Park’s regime before the privatization of the programme by the successive Government.
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the	 rural	 population,	 and	 in	 the	national	 election	 of	 1969,	 the	approval	 rate	 of	 the	 ruling	
Democratic	Republican	Party	of	President	Park	fell	by	15	per	cent	even	in	the	rural	areas,	






rural	 communities	 free	of	 charge	with	one	 restriction:	 usage	 for	 the	welfare	of	 the	entire	
community.	The	plan	received	a	favourable	public	reaction	and	achieved	significant	results	
beyond	 the	Government’s	 prediction.	The	 cost	 of	 free	 cement	was	W4.1	 billion6	 but	 the	
estimated	monetary	value	of	the	projects	carried	out	by	the	rural	community	was	three	times	
the	cost,	at	W12.2	billion	(Park	and	Lee	1997).	Encouraged	by	the	success	and	incorporating	





found	 in	President	Park’s	 impromptu	comments	at	 the	National	Convention	of	 the	Village	
Leaders:	“We	may	call	this	movement	as	the	movement	for	a	better	living”	(Park	1998,	p.	47).	
5  Jung-Hee Park led a military coup on May 16, 1961 and became the Chairman of the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction, which incapacitated the Jang Myun administration. He later discharged himself from the army and 
won the 1963 presidential election as the leader of the newly created Democratic Republican Party. With economic 
development as a main priority of his administration, he legitimized his rule with strong economic growth and the 
alleviation of abject poverty, and won the elections in 1967 and 1971. Though the Constitution of 1963 only allowed a 
person to serve as president for two consecutive terms, Park ran for the presidency a third time in 1971 by amending 
the constitution and had narrowly winning over Dae-Jung Kim. In October 1972, he declared a state of emergency, 
dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the Constitution. In December, a new “Yooshin” Constitution was 
approved, which opened the way for Park to be a lifetime president. Protests calling for the end of Park’s dictatorship 
grew larger among students and later became nationwide. On October 26, 1979, Park’s regime was ended with his 
assassination by Jae-Gyu Kim, the director of the National Intelligence Agency.
6  Approximately $6.8 million (using the exchange rate of $1=W310.58, from http://ecos.bok.or.kr.)
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This	was	later	interpreted	by	Park	Jin-whan,	special	assistant	to	the	President	for	Saemaul	
Undong,	as	a	movement	 to	develop	 the	work	ethics	of	 farmers	by	participating	 in	village	
projects	 to	 accelerate	 rural	 modernization	 (Park	 1998).	 Though	 different	 interpretations	
existed	regarding	how	to	define	the	objectives	of	Saemaul	Undong,	most	agreed	that	the	aim	
was	to	generate	economic,	social	and	attitudinal	improvements.	The	most	broadly	accepted	
objectives	are	(a)	 income	generation,	(b)	 living	environment	and	basic	rural	 infrastructure	
improvement,	and	(c)	capacity-building	and	attitudinal	change.
Annual progress
	 In	 accordance	 with	 the	 change	 in	 the	 focus	 and	 scope	 of	 village	 level	 projects,	
Saemaul	Undong	could	be	divided	into	three	phases.	In	the	initial	phase,	the	priority	at	the	
village	level	was	given	to	the	improvement	of	the	physical	infrastructure.	A	list	of	exemplary	
projects	 was	 developed	 by	 the	 Government	 and	 given	 to	 the	 villages	 as	 a	 guideline	 to	
help	villagers	to	develop	general	ideas	on	what	they	could	do	for	themselves.	As	villagers	
gained	more	confidence	 in	 their	ability	and	 the	basic	 infrastructure	necessary	 to	 improve	
agricultural	productivity,	Saemaul	Undong	shifted	its	focus,	and	income-generation	projects	
were	 gradually	 initiated	 while	 the	 scope	 and	 size	 of	 each	 living	 condition	 improvement	
project	 increased.	 In	 the	 last	phase,	 the	 focus	was	shifted	 towards	capacity-building	and	

















in	 the	 social	 development	 dimension:	 improvements	 in	 basic	 infrastructure;	 increased	
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Income generation and income poverty reduction




























	 In	conclusion,	while	Saemaul	Undong	helped	 to	alleviate	absolute	poverty	 in	 rural	
villages	 by	 providing	 better	 access	 and	 opportunities,	 it	 was	 not	 sufficient	 to	 address	
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Table 1. Change in the poverty rate and the number of people living in poverty
(Thousands	of	people,	percentage)
1965 1970 1978












36.1 63.9 100.0 26.6 73.4 100.0 56.1 43.9 100.0
Absolute 
poverty rate








for	 an	 urban	 household	 and	W17,000	 for	 a	 rural	 household.	Relative	 poverty	 is	 defined	 as	 a	
household	 income	 lower	 than	 one	 third	 of	 the	 average	 national	 household	 income	 level	 (all	
incomes	are	estimated	in	1980	Korean	won).
Table 2. Ratio of rural household income to urban household income
(Unit:	Korean	won)
Year Average monthly income 
of urban household (A)
Average monthly income 
of rural household (B)
Ratio 
(B)/(A) ( percentage )
1967  20 720  12 456  60.1
1970  31 770  21 317  67.1
1973  45 850  40 059  87.4
1976  95 980  96 355 100.4
1979 219 133 185 624  84.7
Source:	Soon-Won	 Kwon	 (1997).	 “Korean	 experience	 in	 poverty	 alleviation	 with	 special	 reference	 to	
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Agricultural income Non-agricultural income




1970   255 800   194 000 75.9  61 800 24.1
1973   480 700   390 300 81.2  90 400 18.8
1976 1 156 300   921 200 79.7 235 100 20.3
1979 1 531 300 1 531 000 68.7 696 200 31.3
Source:	National	Council	 of	Saemaul	Undong	Movement	 in	Korea	 (1999)	 “Saemaul	Undong	 in	Korea”,	
p.	38,	accessed	from	www.saemaul.com/center/www/caups/down/issue/새마을운동(영문).pdf	on	
25	March	2008.	
Table 4. Comparison of per capita rural income to urban income
(Unit:	thousands	of	Korean	won)












1963    12    60    15    24 1.22 0.40
1965    16    92    18    28 1.09 0.31
1970    55   254    43    67 0.79 0.26
1975   140   538   155   250 1.11 0.43
1980   558 2 144   527   705 0.94 0.33
1985 1 087 3 912 1 220 1 492 1.12 0.38
Source:	Lee,	Dong-Pil	and	others	(2004).	Analysis on Cause and Trend of Rural-Urban Gap in Income and 
Development Level,	Research	R490-1	(Seoul,	Korea	Rural	Economics	Institute).
Note:	 The	income	is	calculated	in	nominal	price.
Living environment improvement and basic rural infrastructure establishment
	 It	seems	that	Saemaul	Undong	led	to	substantial	improvements	in	rural	infrastructure	
(table	5).	In	fact,	most	studies	concur	that	Saemaul	Undong	brought	significant	improvements	
in	 the	 rural	 living	 environment	 and	 infrastructure.	 Enlarged	 and	 extended	 roads	 made	
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The	improvement	consequently	created	a	virtuous	circle	of	human	development.	Improved	
basic	 infrastructure	 helped	 to	 increase	 productivity	 and	 income,	 with	 better	 access	 and	
wider	opportunities,	while	also	creating	a	healthier	environment	with	better	sanitation.	Their	
experience	 of	 cooperation	with	 the	Government	 provided	 learning-by-doing	 opportunities	
for	 building	 capacities	 in	 project	 management.	 It	 also	 boosted	 confidence	 and	 changed	
attitudes,	which	 led	 to	 the	empowerment	of	people	 in	 the	villages	and	 transformations	 in	
local	governance.
Table 5. Major achievements of some Saemaul Undong projects in the 1970s
Sources:	 Chang-Soo	Choe	 (2005).	 "Key	 Factors	 to	 Successful	 Community	 Development:	 The	 Korean	
Experience",	Discussion	Paper	No.	 39,	November,	 Institute	 of	Developing	Economies	 (Chiba,	
Japan,	 JETRO),	 p.	 5,	 as	 cited	 in	National	Council	 of	 Saemaul	Undong,	 “Saemaul	Undong	 in	
Korea”	(1999),	p.	24,	table	1;	and	Sung-hwan	Ban,	“Development	of	the	rural	infrastructure	and	




Project Unit Target Performance Ratio
(percentage)
Village roads expansion Km   26 266  43 558 166
Farm feeder roads construction Km   49 167  61 797 126
Small bridge construction Ea   76 749  79 516 104
Small reservoirs construction Ea   10 122  10 742 106
Traditional small irrigation (channel) Ea   22 787  28 352 124
Traditional small irrigation (raceway) Km    4 043   4 442 109
Traditional small irrigation (embankment) Km   17 239   9 180 53
Village centre construction Ea   35 608  37 012 104
Public warehouse construction Ea   34 665  22 143 64
Housing improvement Ea 544 000 225 000 42
Village layout renovation Ea - 2 747 -
Sewage system upgrade/construction Km 8 654 15 559 179
Electricity supply system installation Household 2 834 000 2 777 500 98
Telephone lines - 345 240
Saemaul factory construction/operation Ea 950 717 75
Reforestation Ha 744 354 347 153 47
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Capacity-building and attitudinal change
	 The	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs’	conception	of	rural	villagers	was	not	very	different	from	
the	 stereotypical	 traditional	 interpretation	 of	 them	 that	 outside	 development	 agents	 held	





values	 focusing	 on	 three	 core	 values—diligence,	 cooperation	 and	 self-reliance	 through	
large-scale	training,	seminars	and	workshops.
	 Saemaul	 Undong	 received	 some	 favourable	 responses	 and	 achieved	 some	
meaningful	 results	 in	 its	campaign	 for	attitudinal	change.	More	 than	500,000	people	 took	
part	in	Saemaul	Undong	trainings	from	1972	to	1979.	Based	on	a	survey	of	the	150	Saemaul	
Undong	leaders,	conducted	in	1974,	38	per	cent	chose	increased	cooperation	spirit	among	











of	 people	and	 improvements	 in	 local	 governance.	Saemaul	Undong	created	an	enabling	
environment	 where	 rural	 people	 voiced	 their	 opinions	 and	 made	 themselves	 heard.	
Government	agencies	and	officials	were	considered	as	potential	sources	of	assistance	rather	






















of	 self-reliance	 since	 the	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 Saemaul	 Undong	 required	 further	
















farmers.	This	calculated	cooperation,	however,	 later	became	obsolete	 in	 the	new	society	
built	by	Saemaul	Undong	itself.	The	increase	of	cash	crop	farmers	and	the	commercialization	




Participation and empowerment of people
	 As	much	as	it	was	top-down	and	centralized,	Saemaul	Undong	was	almost	equally	
bottom-up	 in	 some	 ways	 despite	 the	 political	 and	 social	 atmosphere	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	
Korea	at	 that	 time.	While	 the	main	 role	of	 the	central	Government	was	 limited	 to	 leading	




























field	 into	Government	policy.	With	 the	help	of	Saemaul	 leaders,	 it	 delivered	Government	
services	 and	 assistance	 to	 rural	 villages	 and	 coordinated	 various	 kinds	 of	 Government	
support	 to	avoid	any	confusion,	unnecessary	duplication	and	conflicts.	Local	government	
policies	accordingly	became	more	representative	of	their	constituents.
Gender and Saemaul Undong
	 As	 in	many	other	developing	countries,	women	 in	 the	Republic	of	Korea	were	not	
traditionally	welcome	to	engage	in	social	issues.	Saemaul	Undong	opened	a	small	window	




were	 considered	part	 of	men’s	 domain.	The	 tenacious	efforts	made	and	 the	outstanding	
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of	women’s	 rights	 in	 society,	 nor	 did	 it	 create	 systematic	 institutional	 changes	 inside	 the	
Government	 for	 the	 empowerment	 of	 women.	 The	 encouragement	 by	 the	 Government	
for	the	further	engagement	of	women	was	partly	to	address	the	feminization	of	agriculture	
and	 rural	 villages	 caused	 by	massive	migration	 of	men	 to	 urban	 areas	 (Cho	 and	Tinker	
1981).	From	the	beginning,	there	was	no	such	strategy	developed	for	gender	mainstreaming	
to	 address	 the	 deep-rooted	 social	 bias	 and	 discrimination	 against	women.	 	The	 positive	
changes	were	solely	brought	about	by	women’s	own	efforts,	which	were	not	scaled	up	into	
policy	or	institutional	change.








Homogeneous communities with strong tradition of cooperation
	 Rural	 communities	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 had	 some	 distinct	 features:	 a	 long	
history	 of	 settlement	 by	 people	 usually	 related	 to	 each	 other	 by	 kinship;	 rice	 farming	 as	
their	 main	 economic	 activity;	 and	 sharing	 traditional	 customs	 and	 autonomous	 norms	
based	on	Confucian	teaching.	Ethnic	homogeneity	also	contributed	much	towards	cohesive	
cooperation,	 thus	 reducing	 the	possibility	of	disputes	and	conflicts.	Like	many	other	 rural	
villages	 in	Asian	 countries,	 rural	 villagers	 in	 the	Republic	 of	 Korea	 had,	 for	 a	 long	 time,	
already	 known	 and	 realized	 the	 benefits	 of	 cooperation.	 Each	 village	 also	 had	 its	 own	
autonomous	rules	and	customs	for	cooperation	called	doorae, gyae	and	hyang-yak.	Doorae	
is	a	more	than	500-year-old	tradition	of	cooperation	to	do	the	difficult	work	that	could	not	
be	 done	 by	 one	 household.	Gyae	 is	 a	 small	 savings	 scheme	 especially	 popular	 among	






Egalitarian society with land reform
	 It	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 large	 inequalities	 in	 assets,	 such	 as	 property	 and	 land,	
and	 prestige	 have	 a	 tendency	 to	 reduce	 community	 solidarity,	 and	 often	make	 the	 task	
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is	 the	 egalitarian	 rural	 village	 structure	 created	 after	 the	 comprehensive	 land	 reform.	 In	
1950,	 the	 Government	 enacted	 a	 land	 reformation	 law,	 which	 prohibited	 tenant	 farming	
and	put	a	ceiling	on	 land	ownership	of	only	 three	hectares	of	 land	per	person.	The	 land	
reform	practically	 got	 rid	 of	major	 absentee	 landlords	 from	 rural	 villages,	which,	 coupled	
with	migration	 to	 the	cities	of	both	rich	peasants	and	 landless	and	near-landless	 tenants,	
had	the	effect	of	 levelling	incomes	and	homogenizing	the	rural	population.	In	1970,	when	
Saemaul	Undong	was	 initiated,	 94	per	 cent	 of	 rural	 households	held	 farms	 smaller	 than	
two	hectares,	while	 64	per	 cent	 held	 less	 than	one	hectare	 (Goldsmith	1981).	 	With	 the	
demise	 of	 traditional	 ruling	 elites,	 the	 social	 and	political	 structure	 in	 the	 village	became	
more	equitable.	The	relatively	egalitarian	structure	was	favourable	to	Saemaul	Undong	with	
villagers	in	similarly	poor	situations	and	few	possibilities	of	local	capture.
Solid and continuous economic growth
	 Many	 Governments	 in	 developing	 countries	 often	 face	 difficulties	 in	 pursuing	
their	 development	 programmes	 due	 to	 budgetary	 constraints.	 Needing	 to	 overcome	 the	
multifaceted	challenges	of	poverty	and	constrained	by	limited	financial	sources,	developing	
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National leadership and political commitment
	 It	has	been	argued	that	no	policies	or	programmes	can	be	successfully	implemented	
without	 the	 commitment	 of	 the	 Government,	 and	 Saemaul	 Undong	 was	 no	 exception.	
Strong	commitment	and	leadership	from	the	very	top	played	a	crucial	part	 in	 its	success.	
It	was	President	Park,	with	 his	 strong	will	 and	 commitment,	who	 initiated,	 designed	 and	
provided	continuous	support	for	Saemaul	Undong.	He	made	Saemaul	Undong	a	top	priority	
of	 his	 Government,	 checking	 monthly	 progress,	 inviting	 villagers	 to	 cabinet	 meetings	 to	
give	 presentations,	 and	making	 surprise	 visits	 to	 villages	 and	 training	 centres.	A	 strong	
commitment	from	the	top	leader	enabled	effective	vertical	 integration	 linking	all	 the	 levels	




Policies and strategies of the Government
Holistic approach










	 Saemaul	 Undong	 also	 comprehensively	 dealt	 with	 various	 challenges	 that	 the	
villagers	identified,	coping	with	the	multidimensional	challenge	of	poverty.	By	not	focusing	




	 To	 effectively	 address	 the	 multidimensionality	 of	 poverty	 and	 to	 deliver	 the	
comprehensive	 development	 plan	 package	 in	 cooperation	 with	 rural	 villagers,	 the	
Government	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	devised	a	distinct	approach	of	horizontal	coordination.	
The	Government	 delegated	 the	authority	 of	 coordination	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	Home	Affairs,	
under	which	 all	 relevant	ministries	were	mobilized.	A	 committee,	 chaired	 by	 the	Minister	
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Home	Affairs.	In	each	level	of	local	government,	a	special	committee	for	coordination	was	




	 Using	 the	 centralized	 and	 hierarchical	 administrative	 system,	 Saemaul	 Undong	
effectively	 created	 vertical	 integration	 linking	 villages,	 local	 governments	 and	 the	 central	
Government.	Each	level	of	government	managed	programmes	under	its	control	and	reported	









Incentive system and competition
	 The	selective	approach	taken	by	the	Government	acted	as	strong	motivation	for	the	
people	to	be	actively	involved.	In	1973,	based	on	performance	evaluation,	the	Government	




villages	 into	 three	 categories	and	selectively	provided	 villages	with	assistance,	 favouring	
those	advancing	towards	a	“self-sustainable	community”	while	spurring	the	lagging	villages	
to	catch	up	with	others.		
	 Conversely,	 the	 Government	 also	 provided	 successful	 villages	 and	 their	 leaders	







	 Practical	 and	 experience-based	 training	 was	 given	 to	 more	 than	 500,000	 people	
during	the	course	of	Saemaul	Undong	from	1972	to	1980	(Park	1974).	Programmes	provided	
practical	skills	and	 technologies	on	project	management	and	new	 tools	and	 technologies	
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	 Mass	media	 from	 television	and	 radio	 to	newspapers	and	magazines	were	widely	





and	stories.	This	massive	public	 relations	drive	certainly	helped	 to	deliver	 the	necessary	
information	 to	 the	 villagers	 and	 to	 promote	 broader	 participation	 and	 engagement.	 The	
messages,	however,	were	disproportionately	dominated	by	dramatic	success	stories	and	




	 For	 any	 rural	 development	 programme	 to	 be	 successful,	 active	 participation	








	 A	 close	 linkage	 between	 personal	 interests	 and	 village	 projects	 can	 be	 ascribed	
as	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 the	 active	 participation.	 When	 the	 programme	 began,	 village	
level	participation	was	mobilized	by	 the	 local	government	and	was	 limited	 to	 the	passive	
provision	 of	 labour.	 Having	 observed	 the	 positive	 changes	 and	 realized	 the	 possible	
benefits,	villagers	gradually	became	more	proactive.	Under	the	limited	autonomy	they	had	in	
7  Cooperation in Saemaul Undong could be said to be more goal-oriented and systemized. The Saemaul council 
systematically managed cooperation projects, which were evaluated to see whether they achieved their target or 
















democracy	 and	 to	 have	 increased	 influence,	 though	with	 some	 reservation,	 on	 the	 local	
governments.	This	increased	influence,	however,	did	not	lead	to	a	pro-democracy	movement	
against	the	regime.
Devotion and commitment of Saemaul leaders
	 Much	 research	has	 identified	 the	crucial	presence	of	an	organizational	or	political	
“entrepreneur”	 that	mobilizes	 and	 leads	 people	 in	 collective	 activities	 as	 one	 of	 the	 key	






	 It	 is	 interesting	 that,	 though	 they	were	 the	potentially	 powerful	 local	 leaders	often	
with	strong	local	support,	Saemaul	leaders	never	became	a	challenge	to	the	Government	
authority.	 Though	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 it	 had	 predicted	 a	 possible	 threat	 and	 had	
exercised	precautionary	measures,	the	Government	banned	Saemaul	leaders	from	joining	
any	 political	 party.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 people,	 who	 must	 have	 been	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	
commanding	involvement	of	the	Government	in	Saemaul	Undong,	would	not	dare	to	use	the	
very	opportunity	provided	by	the	Government	to	turn	against	it.		




8  In some case they were elected by the villagers, while in others, the leader was designated according to consensus 
among villagers. In other cases, some people volunteered to be Saemaul leaders.
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environments.	 However,	 it	 failed	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	 changes	 and	 lost	 momentum.	
The	spread	of	 individualism	and	the	commercialization	of	agriculture	brought	by	Saemaul	




initiated	 programmes.	 Uplifted	 by	 their	 success,	 the	 Government	 often	 dragged	 and	
prolonged	the	termination	of	some	programmes	until	they	fizzled	out.	The	undefined	ending	
can	also	be	 seen	as	a	 lesson	 learned,	 but	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 completely	 deny	 it	 all	 of	 its	
achievements.
Ambiguity in scope 
	 Even	 before	 Saemaul	 Undong,	 each	 ministry	 in	 the	 Government	 had	 already	
developed	and	implemented	its	own	plans	directly	or	indirectly	related	to	rural	development,	
which	was	later	incorporated	under	the	name	of	Saemaul	Undong.	It	was	therefore	difficult	








Politically motivated for sustaining dictatorship
	 The	most	widely	 accepted	 criticism	of	Saemaul	Undong	 is	 that	 it	was	 not	 a	 rural	
development	 programme	 but	 rather	 a	 propaganda	 campaign	 to	 mobilize	 the	 public	 for	
President	 Park’s	 political	 gain.	 Some	 have	 claimed	 that	 President	 Park	 used	 Saemaul	
Undong	 to	 sustain	 his	 illegitimate	 Fourth	 Republic9	 and	 to	 gain	 much	 needed	 political	
support	from	his	traditional	advocates	in	rural	areas	against	growing	criticism	and	protests	in	
urban	cities.	They	also	argued	that,	to	advertise	the	changes	brought	by	Saemaul	Undong,	
development	efforts	were	often	 concentrated	on	more	 visible	 villages	 close	 to	highways,	
while	remote	communities	were	given	less	assistance.		
9  On 17 October 1972, President Park took a series of drastic measures to give himself life-long presidency. 
He declared a state of emergency, proclaimed martial law, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the 
Constitution. He then promulgated a new Constitution called the “Yooshin (revitalizing) Constitution,” launching the 
Fourth Republic. The change ultimately concentrated all the power of the Government of the Republic of Korea to 
President Park and deeply damaged the civil liberty and democracy movements.
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	 There	seems,	however,	to	be	no	Government	policies,	including	development	policies,	
that	are	neutral	and	 free	 from	political	 influences	and	 interests.	Government	policies	and	
programmes	should	be	evaluated	on	the	extent	to	which	they	benefit	the	targeted	people.	
Top-down model under an authoritarian regime
	 Critics	also	claim	that,	since	Saemaul	Undong	was	 implemented	depending	solely	
and	heavily	 on	President	Park’s	 dictatorial	 leadership,	 it	would	not	work	 in	 a	democratic	
political	context.	It	is	quite	true	that,	without	strong	leadership	and	drive,	it	would	have	been	
very	difficult	to	mobilize	all	the	resources	in	such	a	short	period	of	time	and	make	various	
stakeholders	 cooperate	 closely.	Especially	 in	 the	 first	 phase,	 top-down	directives	and,	 in	








Increased burden on rural people
	 The	 form	of	 contribution	 changed	 from	 labour	 donation10	 to	 cash	 contributions	 as	
the	 focus	was	 shifted	 from	 rural	 infrastructure	 development	 to	 income	generation,	which	













10  In many participatory rural development projects, including Saemaul Undong, villagers took part in some of the 
activities by providing their labour. They worked in construction building, for example, schools and bridges.
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Marginalization of poor people 
	 Though	rural	villages	in	the	Republic	of	Korea	were	relatively	egalitarian,	there	still	














development	 programmes.	 Though	 the	 average	 income	 of	 rural	 households	 and	 the	
general	living	standards	had	increased,	there	were	few,	or	none,	of	the	proactive	measures	
to	 prevent	 the	 further	marginalization	 or	 incorporate	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 extremely	 poor	 in	
Saemaul	 Undong.	 Given	 the	 severe	 disparities	 and	 the	 vast	 number	 of	 people	 living	 in	
absolute	poverty	in	developing	countries	today,	careful	attention	should	be	paid	and	delicate	
strategies	should	be	formulated	before	any	replication	of	Saemaul	Undong	is	made.
Continued urban migration 
	 Despite	 some	 improvements	 in	 rural	 living	 conditions	 and	 increases	 in	 income,	
Saemaul	Undong	did	not	reverse	the	trend	of	urban	migration.	The	rural	population	continued	
to	decrease	during	and	after	Saemaul	Undong,	with	rural	villages	filled	with	the	old	and	the	










replace	 industrial	 development	 or	 to	 deflect	 the	 subsequent	 urban	 migration.	 Economic	
development	 in	 the	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 was	 based	 on	 industrialization	 and	 policymakers	
never	 intended	 to	 change	 that	 course.	 The	 goal	 was	 to	 lessen	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
industrialization	and	 the	 rural	 urban	gap.	Saemaul	Undong	was	designed	 to	prepare	 the	
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rural	 population	 to	 adapt	 to	 urban	 life	 and	 to	 minimize	 the	 impact	 of	 their	 migration	 by	
providing	rural	people	with	technical	training	in	various	fields	and	employment	opportunities	
in	Saemaul	factories	in	rural	areas.	
Table 7. Population growth rate 
(Percentage)
Period Total Urban Rural
1955-1960 2.88 5.51 1.96
1961-1965 2.71 5.96 1.29
1966-1970 1.90 7.16 -1.16
1971-1975 1.98 5.37 -0.81
1976-1980 1.84 4.89 -1.12
Source:	Sun-Woong	Kim	(1980)	“Urbanization	pattern	of	Korea	and	urban	population	increase	component”,	
Korea Development Review,	Spring,	p.151.
Figure 1. Rural population change from 1970 to 1985
Source:	Data	from	the	National	Statistics	Information	Service,	accessed	from	www.kosis.kr	on	7	March	
2008.	














of	 people	 to	 natural	 disasters	 and	 disease	 pandemics	 and	 provided	 easier	 and	 broader	
accesses	to	and	widened	opportunities	for	markets,	better	education	and	resources.	Saemaul	





	 Those	 improvements	 and	 changes	 were	 possible	 as	 Saemaul	 Undong	 utilized	
the	same	policies	and	strategies	 that	most	development	agencies	emphasize	and	utilize	
today	for	their	own	rural	development	programmes.	The	International	Fund	for	Agricultural	
Development	argued	in	its	Rural Poverty Report 2001	that	the	rural	poor	need	legally	secure	
entitlements	to	assets,	especially	land	and	water,	technology,	access	to	markets,	opportunities	











developed	 and	 implemented	 workable,	 practical	 and	 specific	 plans	 and	 strategies	 in	
accordance	with	and	making	use	of	specific	local	contexts.	Few	people	dispute	or	disagree	
with	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 key	 principles	 of	 development,	 such	 as	 building	 an	 enabling	
environment	 or	 promoting	 the	 inclusive	 participation	 of	 local	 people	 in	 the	 development	
programme.		
	 What	 is	more	 difficult	 is	 the	 substantive	 development	 of	 detailed	 plans	 and	 tools	
to	realize	those	abstract	principles	in	specific	local	contexts.	What	“enabling	environment”	
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In	other	words,	it	linked	the	right	policies	with	the	right	conditions.	It	combined	a	favourable	
social	environment	with	cleverly	designed	tools	and	strategies	promoting	the	 involvement	




	 The	 most	 important	 lessons	 learned	 from	 Saemaul	 Undong	 are	 that	 it	 devised	
appropriate	strategies	and	measures	reflecting	and	making	use	of	specific	political,	economic	
and	social	contexts.	Following	the	model	blindly	would	therefore	definitely	not	achieve	the	























Creating an enabling environment based on meritocracy and vertical integration
	 According	to	Boyer	and	Ahn	(1991),	reflecting	the	focus	on	democratization	and	good	
governance,	which	are	central	 in	the	development	agenda	of	today,	many	countries	have	
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heavily	on	the	local	elites	who	dominate	resources	and	power.	Abrupt	decentralization	without	
a	 well-laid	 plan	 and	 insightful	 consideration	 of	 the	 existing	 power	 structure	may	 end	 up	
legitimately	reinforcing	the	vested	interest	of	the	local	elite.	Decentralization	and	devolution	
may	not	 always	be	better	 for	 rural	 community	 development	 programmes	 in	 the	absence	





based	 recruitment	 of	 government	 officials	 was	 also	 important	 to	 lessen	 the	 influence	 of	





and	 duplication	 and	 resulted	 in	 effective	 management.	 Using	 the	 centralized	 structure,	
it	 horizontally	 and	 vertically	 linked	 relevant	 ministries	 and	 coordinated	 their	 activities	
and	plans.	While	 the	central	Government	set	 the	guidelines	and	strategies	 for	 the	whole	
programme,	 each	 level	 of	 local	 government	 planned	 and	 managed	 its	 subprogrammes	




Providing motivation and utilizing personal interests 






























of	 diligence	 and	 cooperation	 promoted	 by	 Saemaul	 Undong	 were	 based	 on	 traditional	
Korean	values.	The	massive	mobilization	of	resources	and	strong	chain	of	command	from	
the	 top	 level	of	Government	 to	 the	villages	were	made	possible	due	 to	strong	 leadership	











Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, December 2009
REFERENCES
Ban,	Sung-Hwan	(1981).	“Development	of	the	rural	infrastructure	and	the	Saemaul	Undong”,	in	Man-
gap	Lee,	ed., Toward a New Community Life, Seoul	National	University,	Institute	of	Saemaul	
Undong	Studies	(Seoul),	p.321.
Boyer,	W.	W.	and	B.	Ahn	(1991).	Rural Development in South Korea	(Newark,	University	of	Delaware	
Press).
Brandt,	V.S.R.	(1981).	“Value	and	attitude	change	and	the	Saemaul	movement”,	in	Man-gap	Lee,	ed., 
Toward a New Community Life, Seoul	National	University,	Institute	of	Saemaul	Undong	Studies	
(Seoul).
Brandt,	V.S.R.	and	M.	Lee	(1979).	Rural Development Movement in Korea,	Korean	National	Commission	
for	the	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization	(Seoul).
Cho,	H.	 and	 I.	Tinker	 (1981).	 “Women’s	participation	 in	 community	 development	 in	Korea”,	 in	Man-






Goldsmith,	A.	 (1981).	 “Popular	 participation	 and	 rural	 leadership	 in	 the	 Saemaul	 Undong”,	 in	Man-
gap	Lee,	ed., Toward a New Community Life, Seoul	National	University,	Institute	of	Saemaul	
Undong	Studies	(Seoul).
Kim,	H.	(2000).	“A	critical	study	on	Saemaul	Undong	(New	Community	Movement)	as	a	modernization	
project:	focused	on	the	1970s”,	Journal of Korea Rural Development, vol.	12,	No.	2,	pp.	21-38.
Kwon,	Soon-Won	(1997).	“Korean	experience	in	poverty	alleviation	with	special	reference	to	the	Saemaul	
Undong”,	Social Security Review,	 vol.	13,	No.	1,	June	 (Korean	Social	Security	Association),	
p.	194.
Lee,	Dong-Pil	 and	others	 (2004).	Analysis on Cause and Trend of Rural-Urban Gap in Income and 
Development Level,	Research	R490-1	(Seoul,	Korea	Rural	Economics	Institute).
National	Council	of	Saemaul	Undong	Movement	in	Korea	(1999).	“Saemaul	Undong	in	Korea”,	pp.	23	
and	 38,	 accessed	 from	 www.saemaul.com/center/www/caups/down/issue/새마을운동(영문).
pdf	on	25	March	2008.		
National	Statistics	Information	Services	(KOSIS),	data	accessed	from	www.kosis.kr	on	7	March	2008.	





Asia-Pacific Development Journal Vol. 16, No. 2, December 2009
Park,	Jin-Whan	(1998).	The Saemaul Movement	(Seoul,	Korea	Rural	Development	Institute).
Park,	J.	and	D.	Ahn	(1999).	“Saemaul	Undong	and	Yushin	Regime”,	Critical Review of History,	No.	2,	
pp.	 37-80	 (Seoul,	 The	 Institute	 for	 Korean	 Historical	 Studies),	 pp.	 37-80,	 accessed	 from	
www.riss4u.net/link?id=A30018881.
Park,	S.	and	H.	Lee	(1997).	“State	and	farmers	in	modern	Korea:	an	analysis	of	new	village	movement”,	
Korean Political Science Review,	vol.	3,	No.	3	(Seoul,	Korean	Political	Science	Association).




poverty	 rate”,	 Monthly Public Finance Forum, No.	 148,	 Korea	 Institute	 of	 Public	 Finance,	
October,	pp.	8-28.
Sun-Woong	Kim	 (1980).	 “Urbanization	pattern	of	Korea	and	urban	population	 increase	component”,	
Korea Development Review,	Spring,	p.151.
World	Bank	(2000).	World	Development	Report	2000/2001	(Washington,	D.C.,	World	Bank).
UN-16-2December09	CH5_113-140.indd			140 1/6/10			11:33	PM
